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Abstract The article provides an overview of the remedies available under the
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods. A short introduction
to the Convention is followed by an analysis of the structure and the basic features of
the Convention’s remedies system. The article then deals with the various remedies
in detail and presents them in their context. The circumstances in which a particular
remedy will be available are explained, as are the requirements for the various reme-
dies, and whether a party in breach of contract can prevent the other party’s use of the
remedy. At the same time, the article emphasises the questions to which satisfactory
answers have not yet been provided, and makes suggestions as to what the appropri-
ate solutions should be. The article finishes with an appreciation of the Convention’s
remedies system and some future prospects.
Keywords UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) · Remedies ·
Breach of contract · Parties’ rights and duties · Failure to perform
1 Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is the most
successful international instrument in the field of commercial law. It was drafted by
the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1980.
Since then, it has been enacted in 76 Contracting States, among them all major trading
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nations, such as the USA, China, India, Germany and Russia.1 Turkey will join on 1
August 2011,2 and Brazil and Portugal will follow soon. The only noticeable absentee
among European countries is the United Kingdom.3
The Convention covers, in principle, approximately 80% of all international sales
contracts.4 An estimated 3,000 published court decisions and arbitral awards and an
abundance of scholarly writing, numerous conferences, and other events5 show the
prominent role the CISG plays in legal practice, legal science, and legal education.
Furthermore, the CISG has influenced many international and national laws. At the
international level, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the EC Directive on Certain As-
pects of the Sale of Consumer Goods,6 and the OHADA7 General Commercial Act8
have all heavily relied on the CISG. At the domestic level, the CISG has served as
a model for revisions made to the law of contract of the Baltic States, several East-
ern European jurisdictions and, in particular, China. The original, basic concept of
the modernisation of the German law of obligations9 was also borrowed from the
Convention.
One reason for the success of the Convention is the way in which its provisions on
remedies are structured. An approach was chosen in the Convention which focuses
on the consequences of a breach rather than on its origin. The starting point is a “fail-
ure to perform any of [one’s] obligations under the contract or this Convention”10.
This failure to perform may consist of late performance, lack of conformity of the
goods, of a breach of duties of information or duties of care, etc. The Convention
uses one single formula to describe the violation of contractual obligations. The only
additional element used to qualify the breach of contract relates to its severity: if the
1An overview of the contracting states can be found at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last accessed on 6 November 2010).
2Id.
3For an examination of the reasons why the United Kingdom has not adopted the CISG, see Bridge [6],
pp. 17, 18 et seq.
4The Convention applies where both parties (i.e., seller and buyer) have their respective places of business
in contracting states (Article 1 para. 1(a)) or where the applicable conflict of laws rules lead to the appli-
cation of the law of a contracting state (Article 1 para. 1(b)), except where the parties have excluded the
application of the Convention. For the possibility of derogating from or modifying the provisions of the
CISG see below, at Sect. 2.
5The annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot is one such event. It takes place
in Vienna (and, for a few years, also in Hong Kong) and is, after the medical congress ‘Der Kongress—
Medizin in Wien’, the biggest annual event in Vienna.
6Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees.
7Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires/Organisation for the Harmonisation
of Business Law in Africa.
8Acte Uniforme sur le Droit Commercial Général/Uniform Act Relating to General Commercial Law.
9Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts of 26 November 2001, BGBl. I 3138. For the impact of the
Convention on the German law reform see Schlechtriem [21].
10Articles 45 para. 1, 61 para. 1 CISG.
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breach is ‘fundamental’,11 the aggrieved party may choose from a larger palette of
remedies than if the breach is a ‘simple’ one.12 The integrative terminology which
has been chosen by the Convention avoids overly theoretical debates about the cause
of the breach and turns the attention to the question which is the really important
one in legal practice—the rights available to either of the parties in case of breach of
contract.
The way in which the remedies are chosen, structured, and conceptualised in the
Convention is a real masterpiece. The CISG was the first legal instrument to intro-
duce certain key elements which, since then, have been applied and copied with great
success, such as a clear-cut remedies concept, a fortunate combination of civil law
and common law approaches, simple terminology, and the avoidance of overly for-
mal procedures. Moreover, the remedies system of the CISG is regarded as providing
a fair balancing of the parties’ interests and has won favour with many domestic laws
and international unification projects.13
This article gives a general view of the remedies under the Convention. It starts
with an overview of the parties’ rights in the event of a breach of contract. The salient
features of the remedies system adopted by the CISG are then dealt with and there-
after the various remedies are discussed in detail.
2 Overview of the remedies available
The following table depicts the remedies available to either buyer or seller in the event
of a breach (or impending breach) of contract. These remedies are the default rules
provided for by the Convention; nothing hinders the parties from agreeing on other or
further remedies or a modified set of remedies in the case of a breach of contract.14 As
can be seen from the table below, the seller has ‘fewer remedies’, but not because the
CISG is particularly buyer-friendly, but rather because certain remedies only make
sense in the case of the buyer.
11For the definition of ‘fundamental breach’ see Article 25 CISG:
“A breach committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other
party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to except under the contract, unless the
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances
would not have foreseen such a result.”
12For details see below, at Sects. 3.1, 4.
13For a recent overview see Schwenzer/Hachem [24], pp. 457, 461 et seq.
14Cf. Article 6 CISG: “The parties may (. . .) derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.” As




• Right to specific performance • Right to payment or specific
performance
• Right to avoid the contract • Right to avoid the contract
• Right to damages • Right to damages
• Right to interest • Right to interest
• Right to suspend performance • Right to suspend perfor-
mance
• Right to repair
• Right to replacement of goods
(substitute delivery)
• Right to diminution of price
Fig. 1 Overview of buyer’s and seller’s remedies for breach of contract
3 Structure and basic features of the Convention’s remedies concept
The Convention has opted for certain basic rules and principles which apply to all of
the remedies for which the CISG provides.
3.1 Principle of Pari Passu remedies
A first salient feature of the remedies system of the CISG is the fact that the rights
available to the injured party in case of breach, are, in principle, on an equal footing
with each other. None of the remedies is superior, and none of them is inferior. They
are all at the injured party’s disposal, and the aggrieved party can freely choose that
remedy which will be most appropriate to meet its interests. There are two exceptions
to the principle of ‘remedies equality’. The right to terminate the contract—so-called
‘avoidance’—will only be available to either of the parties if the breach of contract is
‘fundamental’, that is, if the very basis of the contract has been shaken.15 Similarly,
the right to require substitute goods is reserved to cases of fundamental breach.
3.2 Principle of combinability of damages and other remedies
A second characteristic of the remedies available under the CISG is that all of them
can be combined with damages.16 A party who terminates the contract, for instance,
can, in addition, claim compensation for damages suffered due to the (fundamental)
breach of contract. The same holds true for the party who seeks to obtain performance
of the contract: any damages resulting out of the non-performance of the other party
can be claimed in addition to performance. The list could be extended at will.
15For the legal definition of ‘fundamental breach’ see above, footnote 11.
16Articles 45 para. 2, 61 para. 2 CISG: “The buyer/seller is not deprived of any right he may have to claim
damages by exercising his right to other remedies.”
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A combination of remedies other than damages is not possible because relying on
both of them would be contradictory: the buyer who seeks performance will not, at
the same time, require replacement or a diminution of the contract price. A seller
who claims payment of the purchase price will not, at the same time, avoid the
contract. However, it is perfectly possible that those remedies, which exclude each
other if applied simultaneously, be exercised consecutively, one after the other. The
buyer, for example, who first claims performance—that is, delivery of the goods—
and then finds out that the goods finally delivered are defective, may seek replacement
or diminution of the price.
3.3 Principle of self-help remedy
The Convention subscribes to the concept that the rights which it grants are exercised
by way of declaration made to the other party. It has rejected both the concept that
a party’s rights must be asserted by way of a judicial claim as well as the concept
that rights are effectuated ipso facto, automatically.17 The remedies available under
the Convention are thus self-help devices, exercised by way of unilateral, informal
notification of the other party. This self-help or declaration model is efficient, as it
avoids costly and time-consuming judicial procedures. At the same time, the self-
help approach does justice to the need for legal certainty, which would not be the
case if a breach of contract automatically triggered legal consequences which would
not have to be communicated to the party in breach.
3.4 Principle of notification
A forth basic structural element is the principle of notification. In order to be able
to rely on any of the remedies provided for in the Convention, the buyer who has
received goods must, in principle, have examined the goods “within as short a pe-
riod as is practicable in the circumstances”18 and notified any non-conformity of
the goods—specifying the nature of the lack of conformity—“within a reasonable
time”.19 There are exceptions to the examination and notification requirement,20 but
these exceptions are applied restrictively.21
The rationale of the principle of notification is that the seller must be given a
chance to remedy the defect if it is reasonable and not inconvenient in the circum-
stances.22 The same rationale can be found with regard to preliminary remedies. If
17See Bianca/Bonell/Date-Bah [5], at Article 26 note 2.
18Article 38 para. 1 CISG.
19Article 39 para. 1 CISG.
20Cf. Articles 40, 44 CISG. According to Article 40 CISG, the lack of notifying the seller of the non-
conformity of the goods does not deprive the buyer of its remedies if the seller knew or ought to have
known of facts that could lead to the non-conformity of the goods and did not disclose those facts to the
buyer. Article 44 CISG entitles the buyer to claim a reduction of the price or damages (except for loss of
profit) if it has a ‘reasonable excuse’ for his failure to give the required notice.
21See Martinez Cañellas [16], pp. 261, 266; Honnold [13], §261 in fine.
22See, for many, Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Schwenzer [23], ad Article 38 para. 4.
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a party fears that the other party will not perform in time, it can suspend its perfor-
mance, but it must notify the other party first.23 Similarly, a party which wants to
avoid the contract because of an anticipatory fundamental breach must give notice of
its intention to avoid the contract, except where the party in future breach has made
it clear that it will not perform.24
3.5 Principle of precedence of right to cure
The principle of notification, taken on its own, would not live up to the rationale of
granting the seller a second chance to perform properly. It is only by virtue of a second
fundamental rule that the seller’s ‘chance for second tender’ is safeguarded, namely
by the principle that the seller’s right to cure takes precedence over the buyer’s right
to exercise a remedy. The buyer cannot claim replacement of goods, reduction of the
price, or termination of the contract without having given the seller the opportunity
to cure the defect in the goods.25 Similarly, the sum which the buyer is entitled to
claim as damages will be the loss which remains after the seller’s efforts to cure
the defect.26 With regard to the buyer’s remedy of claiming repair, the question of
whether the seller’s right to cure takes precedence does not emerge, as both parties
aim at the same result; the question of how repair will be supplied will be decided
by the seller as the party with the specific expertise. The question of how the seller’s
right to cure and the buyer’s claim for specific performance interrelate is not raised
either, as the seller’s right to cure presupposes that (defective) performance has been
made. If the seller’s performance has not yet become due but the buyer wishes to
exercise a preliminary remedy, the principle of the seller’s right to cure taking priority
over the buyer’s exercise of remedies is modified accordingly: the seller’s issuance of
adequate assurance that it will perform the contract properly cuts off the buyer’s right
for avoidance or suspension of performance.
The rule that the buyer’s remedies are put on hold as long as the seller enjoys a
right to cure “reflects what merchants do in the real world of commerce”27 and avoids
useless transaction costs.
23Article 71 para. 3 CISG.
24Article 72 para. 2 CISG. For the dispute concerning the question of legal consequences if no notice is
given under Articles 71 or 72 see, e.g., Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Fountoulakis [23], ad Article 71 para. 34;
ad Article 72 para. 17-18.
25For the interrelation of the seller’s right to cure and the buyer’s right to reduce the price, cf. Article 50
CISG, second sentence; for the respective interplay with regard to the buyer’s right to avoid the contract,
cf., for many, CISG-AC Opinion no 5 [1], para. 4.4; Fountoulakis [9], p. 160 et seq.; Ferrari [8], p. 489,
pp. 500–501, with further references. The precedence of the seller’s right to cure over the buyer’s right to
claim replacement of the goods results from the argument that replacement of goods requires a fundamental
breach, whereas, as long as the defect can be cured, the breach of contract has not become fundamental,
see Bianca/Bonell/Will [5], ad Article 48 note 3.1.2; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Müller-Chen [23], ad Article
48 para. 20; Audit [3], note 133; for differing views see Staudinger/Magnus [15] ad Article 48 para. 32;
Herber/Czerwenka [12], ad Article 48 para. 11.
26Cf. Staudinger/Magnus [15], ad Article 48 para. 31.
27Bridge [6], pp. 17, 28.
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4 The remedies in detail
In the section which follows, the principles underlying the remedies concept of the
Convention are concretised by a more detailed analysis of the various remedies.
4.1 Right to performance
The seller’s duties of performance are described in Article 30 CISG. According to
this provision, “[t]he seller must deliver the goods, hand over any documents relating
to them and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this
Convention.” If the seller does not comply with any of these duties, the buyer has
the right to require performance.28 The buyer may thus demand that the contract be
executed by the seller as agreed.
Similar rules can be found with regard to the obligations incumbent on the buyer.
Article 53 CISG states that “[t]he buyer must pay the price for the goods and take
delivery of them as required by the contract and this Convention.” Should the buyer
not perform its duties, the seller “may require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery
or perform his other obligations. . .”29
The Convention provides thus for the remedy of specific performance—a rem-
edy with which continental-European jurisdictions are familiar but which, tradition-
ally, is an exception in common law jurisdictions.30 It may appear that in drafting
the Convention, the representatives of the Roman law tradition prevailed over the
common law jurisdictions. But this impression is deceptive: hidden among other so-
called ‘General Provisions’, Article 28 CISG permits a court not to enter a judgment
for specific performance if the domestic law of the country in which the court is lo-
cated would not provide for such a remedy.31 Thus, whenever specific performance
is sought by judicial means, the outcome will, in the first place, depend on the ad-
missibility of this remedy under the Convention, but, in the second place, also on
whether specific performance would be granted under the lex fori. An English court,
for example, when confronted with a claim for specific performance under a CISG
contract, must consult English law first and examine whether English law would al-
low for specific performance in the case at hand.32 As is generally known, specific
performance in English law is an equitable remedy and still regarded as exceptional.
It will be granted only if damages are not an adequate remedy for the breach of
contract at hand.33 In contrast, a German court would find nothing extraordinary in
28Cf. Article 46 CISG para. 1 CISG: “The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations
unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.”
29Article 62 CISG.
30See, for many, Bianca/Bonell/Lando [5], ad Article 28 note 1.1.
31Article 28 CISG: “If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to
require specific performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment
for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of
sale not governed by this Convention.”
32The courts are obliged to examine the case under the lex fori and do not have the liberty not to consult
their own domestic law, see Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Müller-Chen [23], ad Article 28 para. 20.
33Hanbury/Martin [11], para 24-013 et seq.; Peel [19], para 21-016 et seq.
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upholding a claim for specific performance (if all the requirements are met), because
the right to insist on specific performance is, metaphorically speaking, the ‘spine’ of
the German law of obligations.34 However, it should be noted that a court whose lex
fori would not grant specific performance in the case at hand is not bound to reject
an action for specific performance under the Convention; it is up to the lex fori to
determine whether there is room for discretion,35 and it is suggested that many courts
that would incline against specific relief in domestic cases may incline towards it in
CISG cases, out of a sense of international comity or out of a desire to establish a
favourable environment for international business.36
Of course, there are fears that Article 28 CISG encourages forum shopping. How-
ever, as case law, which now stretches back over thirty years, shows, the role of Arti-
cle 28 has been marginal,37 because commercial parties (whether from a common law
background or not) seem to insist on specific performance only when other remedies
are inadequate. Therefore, the fact that the Convention has opted for granting specific
relief does not lead to a noticeable clash between the Convention and the common
law.
4.2 Right to repair
Article 28 CISG applies not only to an action for specific performance, but also to an
action for repair or replacement of goods.38 As is the case with specific performance,
if repair or replacement are sought extra-judicially, as a matter of informal unilateral
communication from buyer to seller, they are an absolutely valid remedy; however, if
they are claimed judicially, the question of whether they will succeed will depend on
whether the court would grant such remedy under its own law.
The right to repair is a right which, by nature, is reserved to the buyer. If the goods
do not conform to the contract, the buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack
of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable in light of the circumstances.39
The reasonableness test will typically be linked to costs: if the costs of repairing the
goods are disproportionately higher than the costs of acquiring a substitute, or if the
expenditure is incommensurate with the advantage which the buyer will derive from
removal of the defect, the reasonability of requiring repair must be denied.40
34The term was coined by Ernst Rabel in: Recht des Warenkaufs, vol. I, 1936, at 375 (“Erfüllungsanspruch
als Rückgrat der Obligation”).
35Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Müller-Chen [23], ad Article 28 para. 22.
36Cf. Honnold [13], para. 195; Katz [14], p. 378, p. 384.
37The largest database on the Convention, the Pace Database on the CISG and International Commercial
Law (http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/), lists only seven cases in which Article 28 was mentioned (but not
necessarily applied) (last accessed on 6 November 2010).
38Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Müller-Chen [23], ad Article 28 para. 6.
39Article 63 para. 3 CISG.
40See, e.g., Piltz [20], para. 5-188; MünchKommHGB/Benicke [18], ad Article 46 para. 22.
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4.3 Right to replacement of the goods
If the buyer wishes to have the defective goods replaced, it must demonstrate that
the lack of conformity of the goods constitutes a fundamental breach of contract.41
Replacement of the goods can not be claimed in every case of defective goods. The
situation must be such that the buyer cannot reasonably be expected to keep the goods
and have them repaired, or keep the goods unrepaired and declare itself satisfied with
damages and/or price reduction.42 The German Bundesgerichtshof made this clear in
a decision of 1996: the test is “whether other processing or the sale of the goods in
the normal course of business, even if perhaps with a discount in price, is possible
and reasonable without disproportionate expense.” 43
4.4 Right to diminution of the price
A third remedy which, by nature, is available only to the buyer is the right to reduce
the price.44 This remedy is familiar to the civil law jurist: most continental European
sales laws provide for the remedy of contract price reduction in the event of the
delivery of defective goods.45 In contrast, price reduction is a remedy unknown to
common law jurisdictions. In Anglo-American sales laws, a claim for damages is
used to obtain the result of the buyer paying less for goods that do not conform to
the contract.46 Interestingly, the CISG also provides for the right to damages. Price
reduction and damages co-exist, which raises the question why price diminution has
been introduced into the CISG at all, as the same practical result can be achieved
by a claim for damages. A first reason for adopting the remedy of price reduction is
that diminution of the price will be available regardless of whether the seller’s failure
to deliver conforming goods causes any loss to the buyer. A second reason may be
that, if a buyer invokes the right of price reduction, the seller cannot argue that there
was an impediment within the meaning of Article 79 CISG which would exempt
the seller from its liability.47 Finally, the remedy of price reduction might also be
of interest to the seller: the amount by which the price is diminished corresponds to
the ratio between the value that the goods actually delivered had and the value they
were supposed to have.48 This calculation method allows for some additional amount
of risk sharing between the seller and the buyer, because a possible deviation of the
original contract price from the objective (market) value of the goods is maintained.
41Article 46 para. 2 CISG.
42See Bianca/Bonell/Will [5], ad Article 46 note 2.2.2.2; Staudinger/Magnus [15], ad Article 46 para. 61;
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Müller-Chen [23], ad Article 46 para. 40.
43BGH, 3 April 1996, BGHZ 132, 290, 298, CISG-online 135 (www.cisg-online.ch).
44Article 50 CISG.
45Cf., e.g., §442 German BGB; Art. 1644 French Code Civil; Art. 205 Swiss Code of Obligations.
46Cf. Benjamin [4], para. 17-045 et seq.
47For the impediment beyond one’s control which exempts from liability see below, at Sect. 4.5.5.
48The established formula is to multiply the value of the delivered goods multiplied by the contract price
and to divide that sum by the hypothetical value of conforming goods.
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The buyer need not assert its claim for diminution of the price before a court or
arbitral tribunal, and the remedy does not depend on a fundamental breach. However,
prior to exercising the remedy of reduction of the price, the seller must be given the
opportunity to cure the defect in the goods or any other failure in its performance, if
this does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience (Article 48).49
4.5 Right to avoid the contract
4.5.1 In case of actual breach
The right to terminate the contract (so-called ‘avoidance’) will be available in two
situations: either the breach committed by the other party is ‘fundamental’, or it has
become clear that the contract will not be performed at all.
Thus, the first alternative is to show that the breach of contract suffered is affecting
the very basis of the contract (Article 25 CISG). This will entitle the aggrieved party
to set aside the contract.50 In this respect, the seller’s right to cure a breach, which has
been mentioned above, takes precedence: in the case-law and literature, the prevailing
view is that, as long as there is a possibility of curing the defect without causing the
buyer unreasonable inconvenience, the breach of contract is not a fundamental one.51
The second alternative is to terminate the contract because the other party does
not perform its core obligations.52 The term ‘core obligations’—which is not a tech-
nical term under the Convention—is used here to make it clear that not every non-
performance of contractual obligations will give raise to a claim for avoidance of
the contract: the non-performance must relate to the seller’s obligation to deliver the
goods, or to the buyer’s duty to pay or take delivery of the goods.53 As a side obser-
vation, it may come as a surprise to the representatives of the Germanic jurisdictions
that the Convention considers the buyer’s duty to take delivery of the goods as a core
obligation, breach of which could trigger the seller’s right to avoid the contract.54
Not performing within the contractually-agreed period will not yet as such constitute
a fundamental breach, except for cases where time is of the essence and the other
party was aware of that time constraint.55 Therefore, in case of non-performance,
the creditor must first fix an additional period of time within which the debtor may
perform.56 If the latter fails to do so within this additional period, or if it makes it
clear while the additional period is running that it will not perform, the creditor can
49See also above, at Sect. 3.5.
50See Articles 49 para. 1(a); 64 para. 1(a) CISG.
51See the references above, at footnote 25.
52See Articles 49 para. 1(b); 64 para. 1(b) CISG.
53See the wording in Articles 49 para. 1(b); 64 para. 1(b) CISG.
54In the Germanic jurisdictions, there is no independent sanction for failure to take delivery of the goods;
that is, unless otherwise agreed, the buyer cannot claim that the buyer be ordered to take delivery (as a
kind of specific performance), cf., for many, MünchKomm/Kramer [17], Introduction, para. 50.
55See, for many, CISG-AC, Opinion no 5 [1], para. 4.4.
56Article 49 para. 1(b) in connection with Article 47 CISG.
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avoid the contract. This mechanism has been borrowed from the Germanic and Ro-
man jurisdictions and is therefore sometimes also known as the Nachfrist model.57
The additional period must be of “reasonable length”.58 If the period is unreasonably
short, it will be considered as triggering a period of reasonable length; if the creditor
avoids the contract after the elapsing of an unreasonably short period, the creditor
commits itself a breach of contract.59
Avoidance of the contract is a remedy of last resort, because avoidance raises ad-
ditional costs for return transport and insurance which are useless transaction costs.
The ultima ratio character of avoidance makes itself felt not only by qualified re-
quirements, but also in view of Article 51 para. 2 CISG, which states that avoidance
of the entire contract is only permitted if the breach amounts to a fundamental breach
of the entire contract.
4.5.2 In case of pending breach
So far, the right to terminate the contract has been discussed in relation to situations
where performance is due and performance either does not take place or does take
place but not as it should. However, the right to avoid the contract exists also where
the contractual obligations have not yet become due and where there are strong in-
dications that the other party will commit a fundamental breach in the future. This
situation is the so-called anticipatory breach.60
It has been noted that the Convention has adopted several concepts from civil law
jurisdictions: the right to claim specific performance, the right to price reduction, the
right to avoid the contract after the lapse of an additional period of time (Nachfrist
model).61 Although, in those cases, it is actually only the original idea which has been
borrowed from the civil law and, furthermore, significant, common law influenced
modifications have been made in substance, it might be reassuring to know that the
concept of anticipatory breach is a remedy truly rooted in the common law.62
Anticipatory breach stands for the right of both buyer and seller to declare the con-
tract avoided if, prior to the date for performance of the contract, it is clear that the
other party will commit a fundamental breach.63 The exercise of the right of avoid-
ance in case of anticipatory breach is based on a prognosis: it must be ‘clear’, as Ar-
ticle 72(1) states, that the contract will be fundamentally breached by the other party.
The threshold applied by courts and arbitral tribunals is high. For example, it must be
57See Secretariat Commentary, ad Article 43 Comment 8 (“Nachfrist, mise en demeure”).
58Article 47 para. 1; Article 63 para. 1 CISG.
59See MünchKommBGB/Huber [17], ad Article 47 para. 13.
60There is a further possibility for avoidance of the contract before performance is due, which will not be
dealt with here: Article 73 para. 2 CISG entitles the buyer to avoid an installment contract for the future
if the seller’s breach of contract with regard to an installment gives the buyer “good grounds to conclude
that a fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future installments”.
61Above at Sects. 4.1, 4.4, 4.5.1.
62For the common law origin of anticipatory breach, see, for many, Bianca/Bonell/Bennett [5], ad Article
72 note 1.4.
63Article 72 para. 1 CISG.
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clear that the seller will not deliver because it lost its production facilities, or it must
be clear that the buyer will not pay because of subsequent payment restrictions.64 In
such a case, the party which fears it will soon be the victim of a fundamental breach
must, in principle,65 give notice to the other party in order to permit it to provide
adequate assurance.66
4.5.3 Declaration of avoidance
Once a right of avoidance has been established, the party wishing to resort to that
remedy must declare avoidance of the contract. The Convention is clearly against an
ipso facto avoidance, which would automatically extinguish the contract once the re-
quirements of contract avoidance are met.67 For example, under some national laws,
such as Swiss or former German law, the fact that a contract will never be performed
because its performance was impossible from the beginning renders the contract au-
tomatically invalid, without requiring that the impossibility or the ineffectiveness of
the contract be asserted by one of the parties.68 Matters are different under the Con-
vention, and rightly so, as the declaration model clearly enhances legal certainty and
predictability.
The declaration may also consist of simple, non-legal language; the courts are
usually generous in this respect. For example, a letter which stated that “the glass
is full” and “enough is enough” was considered as declaration of avoidance.69 The
declaration of avoidance may also be implicit, as long as it is sufficiently clear that
the way in which the creditor is acting at that moment implies communication of
avoidance.70
4.5.4 Restitution and accounting for benefits
4.5.4.1 Restitution If the contract has been declared avoided, each party can claim
restitution of what it has performed under the contract. The buyer can claim back the
purchase price; the seller can claim return of the goods. For the buyer who wishes to
terminate the contract there is one more obstacle: it cannot do so if it cannot make
restitution of the goods substantially in the condition in which it received them.71
This rule is of Roman law origin and is still present in many civil law sales laws:
64For further illustrations cf. Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Fountoulakis [23], ad Article 72 para. 11;
Staudinger/Magnus [15], ad Article 72 para. 6.
65Article 72 para. 3 provides for an exception from the duty to give notice where it has been made clear
by the debtor that it will not perform its obligations.
66Article 72 para. 2 CISG. This will typically be a bank guarantee, for details see Staudinger/Magnus [15],
ad Article 71 para. 48 et seq.
67See above, at Sect. 3.3.
68See Article 20 para. 1 Swiss Code of Obligations; former §306 of the German BGB.
69RB Kortrijk, 4 June 2004, CISG-online 945.
70See, e.g., Audiencia Provincial Castellòn, 21 March 2006, CISG-online 1488; OLG Karlsruhe, 19 De-
cember 2002, IHR 2003, 125, CISG-online 817.
71Article 82 para. 1 CISG.
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avoidance is excluded if the goods have been destroyed or damaged or changed so
that they cannot be returned substantially in the original condition.72 The principle
of restitution in natura is a weak point in the Convention, as it is scarcely suited for
modern international sales laws. It comes as no surprise that the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples, the PECL, and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) did not follow
the Convention in this respect and chose to provide for the option to make restitution
in money instead.73
Fortunately, the principle of restitution in natura is made subject to considerable
modifications in the Convention. According to paragraph 2 of Article 82 CISG, avoid-
ance is still possible (a) if it is not the buyer’s responsibility that the goods cannot be
returned substantially in the original state; (b) if the goods perished or deteriorated
in the course of the examination of the goods as required in Article 38 CISG; or (c)
if the goods were sold, consumed or transformed in the normal course of business
before the lack of conformity was or ought to have been discovered by the buyer.
4.5.4.2 Accounting for benefits Restitution is complemented by an equalisation of
benefits. The rationale of equalising benefits is that the parties should be put in the
same economic position in which they were prior to performing their respective con-
tractual obligations.74 The seller, in addition to paying back the purchase price, must
also pay interest on it, from the date on which the price was paid.75 The buyer, along
with returning goods, must account for all benefits which it has derived from the
goods.76
Article 84 CISG is troubling in certain respects for both courts and scholars. A first
uncertainty relates to the duty to pay interest. The Convention does not state any in-
terest rate, either in Article 84 or in the general rule on interest, Article 78. The reason
for leaving the issue of the interest rate open is that no consensus could be found at
the Drafting Conference; there were incompatible views, not only of an economic
or political nature, but also, and more particularly, with regard to philosophical and
religious ways of thinking.77 The solution found in Article 84 (and also in Article 78)
was the least common denominator: there should be a duty to pay interest, but the in-
terest rate was not defined. This raises a first difficulty with regard to the application
of Article 84: numerous approaches have been suggested for the determination of the
interest rate, from the application of interest rates which find world-wide acceptance
to a direct or analogous application of the respective rules under unification projects
or to the resort to domestic law.78 The answer to the question is still in flux. A sec-
72Cf., e.g., Article 207 Swiss Code of Obligations; Articles 391–394 Greek Civil Code; Art. 1647(1)
French Code Civil.
73Article 7.3.6 para. 1, second sentence, UNIDROIT Principles; Article 9:309 PECL; Article III.-3:511
paras. 3, 4 DCFR.
74Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Fountoulakis [23], ad Article 84 para. 3; Staudinger/Magnus [15], ad Article
84 para. 1.
75Article 84 para. 1 CISG.
76Article 84 para. 2 CISG.
77Schlechtriem [22], para. 317.
78See Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Fountoulakis [23], ad Article 84 para. 16 et seq.; Staudinger/Magnus [15],
ad Article 84 para. 9.
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ond uncertainty is whether, if the court or arbitral tribunal arrives at determining the
interest rate applicable under Article 84 para. 1 CISG, the same interest rate should
also apply under Article 78 CISG. The question could be answered in the affirmative
at first blush for reasons of efficiency; but then the question emerges why the Con-
vention provides for the duty to pay interest in two different provisions (Article 84
and Article 78). No consensus has been found to date.
The buyer’s duty to account for benefits (Article 84(2)) is similarly unclear. What
types of benefits should be accounted for? How are benefits to be calculated if resti-
tution takes place by way of exception, that is, despite the fact that the goods cannot
be returned in an unimpaired condition?79 What kind of costs incurred by the buyer
when using the goods or otherwise drawing benefits from them can be deducted from
the sum to be paid to the seller? What about foregone benefits—are they to be ac-
counted for? These are questions that have not yet been clearly answered.80
4.5.5 Right to damages
Damages are the most important remedy in practice, because they provide for mone-
tary relief, which is more easily enforced against local assets or against an issuer of a
letter of credit than specific reliefs, such as performance, substitution, or repair.81
Most civil law jurisdictions require that, in order to be able to claim damages,
the other party must have been at fault. The Convention follows the common law
approach, which requires no fault on behalf of the party in breach.82 The aggrieved
party can claim all sorts of damages suffered as a consequence of the breach, as
long as the loss was foreseeable as a possible consequence of the breach. Article 74
CISG uses a simple but powerful formula: damages “consist of a sum equal to the
loss, including loss of profit, suffered as a consequence of the breach”. The provision
aims at putting the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the party in breach had
properly performed the contract. The essential basic concept is the principle of full
compensation.83 As can be imagined, the calculation of damages available in case
of breach raises many questions, such as what kind of loss should be compensated
or where the limits of foreseeability of the loss must be drawn. In recent times, the
discussion has reached a new dimension by challenging the very purpose of damages:
whereas, until recently, damages were exclusively considered as compensation for
economic loss, they are now also being discussed as mechanisms of preventing and
punishing contract violations which do not cause any economic loss.84
The Convention provides for special rules for the calculation of damages where
the contract has been avoided and a cover purchase has been undertaken85 or where a
79Cf. Article 82 para. 2 CISG and above, at Sect. 4.5.4.1.
80See also Bridge [7], (“considerable capacity to surprise by throwing up problems that have not been
foreseen.”).
81See Katz [14], pp. 378–386.
82Cf., for many, Schlechtriem [22], para. 286.
83Cf. CISG-AC, Opinion no 6 [2], Comment 1.
84Disgorgement of profits is such an example for expanding the remedy of damages, see
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Schwenzer [23], ad Article 74 para. 43.
85Article 75 CISG.
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cover purchase has not been undertaken but a current market price exists.86 There is
a duty to mitigate damages,87 as an expression of fair dealing in international trade,
which is frequently evoked in legal practice.88 No damages must be paid if the debtor
is exempt from liability due to an impediment which lies beyond its control.89
4.5.6 Interest
The second last point on the remedies list is the right to interest. “If a party fails to
pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest
on it.”90 It has been mentioned that the interest rate applicable has not been settled in
the Convention and that there are manifold suggestions as to how to determine it.91
In practice, the question is usually solved by having recourse to national law.92
4.5.7 Right to suspend performance
The right to suspend performance is a preliminary remedy which is usually neglected
in scholarly writing, although it is of great practical importance: if it is highly prob-
able that the other party will not perform a “substantial part of [its] obligations”93, it
makes sense to grant the first party the right to suspend its own performance rather
than having it perform and thereby knowingly exposing itself to the risk of not receiv-
ing in return what was contractually agreed on. Of late, the right of suspension has
been the subject of much discussion, especially with a view to expand its application
under the Convention. There have been efforts to turn the right of suspension (which
has hitherto been limited in its scope) into a general remedy which would be avail-
able on each occasion when chances are—in all probability—small that the debtor
will fulfil all its contractual duties.94
5 Summary
The remedies under the Convention can be summarised as follows: they are on an
equal footing, with no remedy taking precedence over any other. They can be com-
bined with damages. All of the remedies are self-help remedies that can be exercised
86Article 76 CISG.
87Article 77 CISG.




91Above, at Sect. 4.5.4.2; for details, see Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Bacher [23], ad Article 78 para. 26 et
seq.
92Staudinger/Magnus [15], ad Article 78 para. 12 et seq.; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Bacher [23], ad Article
78 para. 27, with further references.
93Article 71 para. 1 CISG.
94For details see Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Fountoulakis [23], ad Article 71 para. 11-12.
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Unqualified remedies Semi-qualified remedies Fully qualified remedies
• Right to specific perfor-
mance (but see Article 28)
• Price reduction • Right to claim substi-
tute goods
• Interest • Damages • Right to avoid the con-
tract
• Right to repair
• Right of suspension
Fig. 2 Classification of remedies
by way of a unilateral, informal declaration, without having to assert the right in ju-
dicial proceedings. The availability and the extent of the buyer’s remedies depend on
whether the seller is able and willing to cure the defect without causing unreasonable
inconvenience.
The remedies for which the Convention provides are subject to different levels of
requirements. The right to interest and the right to claim specific performance depend
on nothing more than simple non-payment or non-performance. They could therefore
be deemed ‘unqualified remedies’ in that they are not subject to any other, specific
requirement which would restrict their application. In contrast, the remedies of price
reduction and damages are subject to more rigid requirements: they depend on the
seller’s failure to cure the defect. The right to claim repair requires that resorting to
that remedy be reasonable. Also the right to the preliminary remedy of suspension
of performance depends on a “substantial part” of the other party’s obligations being
likely to remain unperformed. Thus, all of these remedies can be grouped under the
term ‘semi-qualified remedies’, in that something more than a mere breach of contract
is required. The last group of remedies consists of the right to avoid the contract and
the right to claim substitute delivery. The level of requirements is the highest for these
remedies, as they require a (future) fundamental breach on behalf of the other party.
They could be called ‘fully qualified remedies’. The suggested classification can be
tabulated as in Fig. 2.
6 Final remarks
The goal of this short overview is to familiarise European lawyers with the basic
principles and rules of the remedies system of the CISG. There is a wealth of case law
and scholarly writing which deals with particular questions in detail. The abundance
of literature shows the immense level of interest the Convention has given rise to
among the legal community. The discussion of specific points under the Convention
assists not only in interpreting its provisions; it also benefits more recent supra- and
international unification projects. It speaks for the quality of the remedies rules of the
Convention that the UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL, and the DCFR adopted the
remedies system of the CISG without making any substantial changes to it. Despite
the fact that practitioners still hesitate to apply the Convention, for reasons that have
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been described elsewhere,95 with its well-balanced and elaborate remedies system,
the CISG has nonetheless set the standard for national and international sets of rules.
References
1. Advisory Council, Opinion no 5: The buyer’s right to avoid the contract in case of non-conforming
goods or documents, 7 May 2005, http://www.cisgac.com/
2. Advisory Council, Opinion no 6: Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74, Spring 2006,
http://www.cisgac.com/
3. Audit, B.: La vente internationale de marchandises. Commentaire de la Convention des Nations Unies
du 11 avril 1980. L.G.D.J., Paris (1990)
4. Benjamin, J.P.: In: Guest (ed.) Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 7th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London (2006)
5. Bianca, C.M., Bonell, M.J. (eds.): Commentary on the International Sales Law. Giuffré, Milan (1987)
6. Bridge, M.: A law for international sales. Hong Kong Law J. 37, 17–40 (2007)
7. Bridge, M.: The nature and consequences of avoidance of the contract under the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Int. Law Rev. Wuhan Univ. 10, 118–128 (2008–2009)
8. Ferrari, F.: Fundamental breach of contract under the UN Sales Convention—25 Years of Article 25
CISG. J. Law Commer. 25, 489–508 (2006)
9. Fountoulakis, C.: Das Verhältnis von Nacherfüllungsrecht des Verkäufers und Vertragsaufhe-
bungsrecht des Käufers im UN-Kaufrecht, Zeitschrift für Internationales Handelsrecht (IHR), pp.
160–168 (2003)
10. Fountoulakis, C.: The parties’ choice of ‘neutral law’ in international commercial sales contracts. Eur.
J. Law Reform VII(3/4), 303–329 (2005)
11. Hanbury, H.G., Martin, J.E.: Modern Equity, 17th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London (2005)
12. Herber, R., Czerwenka, B.: Internationales Kaufrecht, Kommentar zu dem Übereinkommen der Ver-
einten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf. C.H. Beck,
Munich (1991)
13. Honnold, J.O.: Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 3rd
edn. Kluwer Law International, The Hague (1999)
14. Katz, A.W.: Remedies for breach of contract under the CISG. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 25, 378–396 (2006)
15. Magnus, U.: von Staudinger, J. Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und
Nebengesetzen, Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). Sellier–de Gruyter, Berlin (2005)
16. Martinez Cañellas, A.: The Scope of Article 44 CISG. J. Law Commer. 25, 261–271 (2005–2006)
17. Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 5th edn. C.H. Beck, Munich (2007)
18. Münchener Kommentar zum HGB, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich (2007)
19. Peel, E.: Treitel’s Law of Contracts, 12th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London (2007)
20. Piltz, B.: Internationales Kaufrecht, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich (2008)
21. Schlechtriem, P.: The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the Context of Common
Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe, Oxford University Comparative Law
Forum at ouclf.iuscomp.org (2002)
22. Schlechtriem, P.: Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, 4th edn. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, (2007)
23. Schlechtriem, P., Schwenzer, I.: In: Schwenzer (ed.) Commentary on the UN Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2010)
24. Schwenzer, I., Hachem, P.: The CISG—successes and pitfalls. Am. J. Comp. Law 57, 457–478 (2009)
95Fountoulakis [10], pp. 303–317 et seq.
